This paper presents a corpus-based approach to investigating the function of metaphor, specifically to the question whether the use of metaphorical language is motivated primarily by stylistic considerations or by cognitive principles. The paper focuses on concepts that can be expressed alternatively by a literal or a metaphorical linguistic expression with the same structural properties. Such expressions can be individual words (such as grasp and understand, which can both encode the concept understand), or fixed phrases (such as in the heart of and in the center of, which can both encode the concept in the center of). It turns out that a comparison of the distinctive collocates of the literal and the metaphorical variant in each case provides clear evidence for the hypothesis that metaphorical language has a cognitive function.
. Introduction
There are currently two main hypotheses in the language sciences concerning the function of metaphorical language: one that assumes the use of metaphorical language to be motivated primarily by stylistic considerations, and that I will therefore refer to as the stylistic hypothesis; and one that assumes the use of metaphorical language to be a reflection of a general cognitive mechanism, and that I will therefore refer to as the cognitive hypothesis.
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In this paper, I develop a corpus-based method for investigating a particular type of metaphorical expression, with the dual aim of providing initial answers concerning the plausibility of these two hypotheses and demonstrat-The view of metaphor that I refer to as the cognitive hypothesis is diametrically opposed to the stylistic hypothesis. Instead of treating metaphorical expressions as ornamental stylistic devices, it regards them as a pervasive feature of everyday language More importantly, it views metaphor as a conceptual (or mental) phenomenon, whose "essence . . . is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 5) . In other words, the main function of metaphorical language is that of enabling us to understand abstract concepts (i.e. concepts that are not directly accessible via bodily (sensory) experience) in terms of concrete concepts (i.e. concepts that are directly accessible to us). This view can also be traced back to antiquity (cf. Jäkel 1999 for a brief historical survey), but the most recent and most detailed account of it comes from Lakoff and his colleagues, (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Grady 1997 Grady , 1999 , and the contributions in Gibbs & Steen It should be noted that there is some a priori evidence for this view. First, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and many others following their approach have shown that metaphorical language is pervasive in all registers and that it is highly systematic, i.e. that metaphorical expressions can systematically be related to very general mappings of concrete source domains to abstract target domains (e.g. emotions (Kövecses 1986) ; law (Winter 1989) ; economics, science, and mental activity (Jäkel 1997) ; religion (Biebuyck et al. 1998) ; politics (Lakoff 1996; Partington 2003) ; education (Cameron 2003) , etc.) This pervasiveness and systematicity of metaphor could not be accounted for if metaphor were simply a stylistic phenomenon.
Second, there is often no literal way of expressing a given concept (for example, the expression at 5 o'clock is based on the metaphor time is space (cf. Radden 1997) , but there is no literal paraphrase). If metaphor were simply ornamental, there should be a literal expression corresponding to every metaphorical one, since there should always be a literal statement capable of being 'ornamented' in the first place.
Finally, it has been shown that metaphors always map more concrete domains onto more abstract domains, never the other way around (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 112; Lakoff 1987: 281; cf. Jäkel 1997: 57-65) . For example, we talk about time in terms of money (as in saving, spending, or wasting time), but we do not talk about money in terms of time (for example, measuring money in seconds or minutes). This unidirectional transfer from concrete to abstract domains has also been observed in processes of diachronic change, both in the context of the conceptual theory of metaphor (cf. e.g. Sweetser 1990 ) and in the literature of semantic change and grammaticization in general (cf. e.g. Hopper & Traugott 2003) . If metaphor served a purely stylistic function, this unidirectionality would have to be regarded as an accident; in contrast, the cognitive hypothesis accommodates this fact naturally: since abstract concepts are more difficult to understand than concrete aspects of the environment, it makes sense that the direction of transfer is from the concrete to the abstract, as the opposite direction would inhibit understanding rather than facilitating it.
. Method
One of the fundamental methods in corpus-linguistic approaches to (lexical) semantics is the analysis of a word's collocates, i.e. of the words that occur (with above-chance frequency) in a user-defined span around the word in question (Sinclair 1991: 170, 175; cf. Barnbrook 1996: 87-106 for discussion). One aspect of lexical semantics that is particularly suitable to this approach is the investigation of the (sometimes very subtle) semantic differences between near synonyms (cf. e.g. Kennedy 1991) . A sophisticated method for this task is suggested by Church et al. (1991) , who analyze the near-synonyms strong and powerful, taking into account not simply the collocates of each of these adjectives, but actually calculating the degree to which each collocate is associated with the word in question as opposed to its near synonym. In this approach, a 'distinctive' collocate (Gries 2003 ) is a word that occurs more frequently than chance with one of the members of a pair of synonyms given its overall frequency with both members of the pair.
More recently, Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004) have suggested that the application of this general procedure is not limited to the investigation of lexical semantics. Instead, they demonstrate that it can be extended to the domain of grammatical constructions, where it can shed light on semantic factors influencing the choice between near-synonymous constructions (so-called 'argument structure alternations' , such as the 'dative shift' , but also other kinds of alternation, such as that between the s-genitive and the of -construction or the will-future and the going-to-future).
In the following, I will demonstrate that this procedure can also be utilized in investigating the function of metaphor. Note that while in many cases a metaphorical expression is the only choice available to a speaker for expressing a given meaning (cf. Section 2.1 above), in many cases there are literal alternatives, as in the following examples (the metaphorical examples are from the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (CCED), the literal counterparts are constructed):
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(1) a. [She has] a busy dentist's practice in the heart of London's West End ≈ She has a busy dentist's practice in the center of London's West End U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y Given such pairs of literal and metaphorical patterns, we can determine which lexemes occurring in a given slot best distinguish between the two members of a pair, i.e. which lexemes are most strongly associated with one of the alternatives in comparison to the other. These lists should then allow us to uncover systematic differences between the literal and the metaphorical expression, and to determine whether the motivation for these differences is more likely a cognitive one or a stylistic one. Following the terminology introduced in earlier work (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2003; Gries & Stefanowitsch 2004a, b;  cf. also Stefanowitsch & Gries, forthcomming a), I will refer to a lexeme occurring in a particular slot in a pattern as a collexeme, and to its statistically significant association with one member of a pair of patterns as its distinctiveness.
5 In order to calculate the distinctiveness of a potential collexeme, one needs four frequencies: the lemma frequency for the collexeme in the first pattern (in this case, the literal one), the lemma frequency for the collexeme in the second pattern (in this case, the metaphorical one), and the frequencies of both patterns with words other than the potential collexeme in question. 6 These are then entered into a two-by-two table and submitted to a distributional statistic of one's choice. Take the pair of patterns in example (1) above; both of its members occur frequently with the noun city. The information needed to determine whether city is a distinctive collexeme for one of the two patterns is shown in Table 1 (for expository purposes, it also gives the expected frequencies for each combination of noun and pattern in parentheses). The figures in italics are derived directly from the corpus (the British National Corpus, Release 1), the other figures are the results of additions and subtractions. U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y
The function of metaphor  If we submit these figures to a distributional statistic such as the FisherYates exact test or the Chi-square test, we find that the the probability of error for this distribution is exceptionally small (Fisher-Yates exact: p = 6.24E-08; Chi-square: χ 2 = 32.84 (df = 1), p = 1.00E-08). 7 This tells us that the noun city is indeed highly significantly distinctive for one of the two patterns. It does not tell us for which one, however, since any distributional statistic can determine whether the observed frequencies in one or more cells of a table deviate significantly from the expected frequencies, but cannot determine the direction of deviation. In order to determine which of the two patterns city is distinctive for, we need to determine the direction in which the observed frequencies of occurrence deviate from the expected ones. In this case, city occurs about twice as frequently as expected in the metaphorical pattern, and roughly half as frequently as expected in the literal one. Thus, city is highly distinctive for the pattern in the heart of NP.
8 In isolation, this finding does not tell us much about the function of the metaphorical pattern as opposed to the literal one, but once we repeat the procedure just described for all nouns occurring in the slot in question in either or both of the two patterns, we get complete lists of distinctive collexemes for each of the two constructions, ranked by association strength. These lists then allow us to investigate the issue in the manner described above.
A brief comment on measures of association strength is in order at this point. In principle, any association measure can be used to calculate distinctiveness. In the example above, both the Fisher-Yates exact test and the Chisquare statistic were used, and they yielded results on the same order of magnitude. Other statistics that could be directly applied or adapted to the task include mutual information (MI, cf. Church & Hanks 1990) , and the loglikelihood coefficient (cf. Dunning 1993) . However, given the extremely sparse data we frequently have to deal with in the kind of procedure outlined above, it is highly desirable to use the exact test, since the distributional conditions for the approximate tests are frequently not met (cf. the discussion in Stefanowitsch & Gries 2003: 217f.; Gries & Stefanowitsch 2004) . For this reason, all analyses presented below are based on the Fisher-Yates exact test, whose pvalue is interpreted directly as a measure of association strength (cf. Pedersen (1996) , Pedersen, Banerjee and Purandare (2003) ; cf. also Stefanowitsch and Gries (2003: 238f ., Note 6), for more detailed justification).
In order to apply distinctive-collexeme analysis to the issue at hand, we need a formal context that straightforwardly allows us to compare the collexemes of the literal and the metaphorical alternative systematically. For exam-U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y  Anatol Stefanowitsch ple, it would be highly problematic simply to compare the collexemes of the expressions go up and increase from (1b) above, since they differ in the range of complementation patterns: increase can be used transitively (so that the agent or 'increaser' appears as the subject and the 'thing-increased' as the direct object), or intransitively (with the 'thing increased' as the subject). For go up, only the latter option is available. If we compared all subject collexemes of the two expressions, the list for increase would contain many agents for purely syntactic reasons. If, on the other hand, we compare all 'thing-increased' collexemes, we would miss potential differences between the transitive and the intransitive use of increase (for example crime can increase itr , but you cannot increase tr crime). A similar problem arises with understand and grasp in (1c) above: both may occur with the 'content understood' as a direct object or a that-clause, but in addition, understand, but not grasp, may occur with the 'person understood' as a direct object (cf. Rusty nodded as though she understood the old woman (CCED), but not *Rusty nodded as though she grasped the old woman). The problems posed by such formal differences are clearly not insurmountable; a sufficiently fine-grained analysis paying attention to all formal differences and their potential repercussions could certainly be devised. 9 However, for the present study, the first of its kind and thus partly intended to test the feasibility of the method in the first place, I will limit the investigation to synonyms that share the same (set of) interpretations in the same formal pattern, as in the case of in the center/heart of NP in (1a) above.
After surveying a range of potential pairs of expressions, I selected five pairs conforming to the grammatical pattern [(Preposition) 
, exemplified by the patterns in (1a) above. The patterns were chosen so that they differ from each other according to a range of factors described in detail in the next section in order to make the study as broad as possible given the formal limitations imposed. The five pairs selected are shown in (2a-e): (2) This study is largely exploratory, and will therefore refrain from formulating specific predictions following from the two hypotheses outlined in the preceding section. Instead, the aim is to generate potentially relevant data sets and attempt to relate them to the broad distinction between stylistic and cognitive functions. This may in turn lead to more specific hypotheses, which can then be tested more rigorously. However, even an exploratory study should be explicit about its expectations with regard to the data at least at a very general level, so as to avoid completely subjective post-hoc interpretations that would be unsuitable for developing more specific hypotheses. Let us therefore briefly outline these expectations.
Recall that if the stylistic hypothesis is correct, the function of metaphor is to make a text more pleasurable, vivid, beautiful, eloquent or evocative. It is difficult to derive specific expectations from such a function with regard to systematic differences in the distinctive collexemes of a literal/non-literal pair of expressions. In the worst case, it might be the case that there are no systematic differences at all; what is pleasurable, vivid, beautiful, eloquent or evocative may depend so strongly on the general context in which an expression is used that a primarily stylistic motivation cannot show up in the list of collexemes at all. If this were the case, the stylistic hypothesis would be unfalsifiable. However, it seems plausible to assume that, if the stylistic hypothesis is correct, the stylistic motivation for the metaphorical variant will show up in the form of at least some distinctive collexemes with a clearly literary or poetic flavor, for example, words referring to emotionally charged concepts, archaic words, words from a highly literary register, etc.
In contrast, if the cognitive hypothesis is correct, the function of metaphor is to enable us to understand a text in the first place. This function would lead us to expect a very specific systematic difference between the concepts referred to by the distinctive collexemes of the two expressions: the collexemes of the metaphorical expression should refer to more complex (i.e. less directly experiencable and thus less easily understandable) concepts than the collexemes of the literal expression. This prediction may at first glance seem counterintuitive: we might expect metaphorical expressions to create an additional processing problem for speaker and hearer, and this assumption would lead to the opposite prediction, namely that contexts that are already complex should prefer literal expressions. However, according to the cognitive hypothesis, metaphor does not increase processing difficulties (and there is psycholinguistic evidence that backs up this view, cf. Gibbs (1994) ). In fact, the whole point about the cognitive hypothesis is that the use of metaphorical language may reduce processing difficulties. In other words, the function of metaphor could be described as one of giving 'conceptual support' to our understanding of complex concepts.
Of course, 'complexity' is not an uncontroversial and unambiguous technical term, and thus the issue of which concepts are more or less complex than others is open to debate; the feasibility of the method depends on the plausibility of the judgments about complexity made in the interpretation of the results it yields.
In the case studies presented below, I will base my judgments explicitly on a set of assumptions which hopefully are commonsensical enough to be uncontroversial. They are largely based on well-known principles of gestalt perception (cf. Wertheimer (1938) for the first formulation of these principles and e.g. Garner (1974) for evidence that percepts that adhere to these principles are easier to process than those that do not). The assumptions are the following:
Assumption 1: At a particular level of granularity, concepts representing small entities are less complex than those representing large entities (because they are easier to conceptualize in their entirety). This follows from the gestalt principle of Figure-Ground perception.
Assumption 2: Concepts representing entities that have a simple shape and/or have a clear boundary are less complex than those representing entities with complex shapes or fuzzy boundaries (because they are more easily delineable). This follows from the gestalt principles of closure and simplicity.
Assumption 3: Concepts constituting holistically perceived wholes are simpler than concepts constituting to details or component parts of wholes. This follows from the gestalt principle that configurations are simpler to perceive than their parts.
Assumption 4: Concepts representing individually attributable human actions are simpler than concepts representing non-attributable processes (because they are closer to our everyday experience of ourselves and our interaction with the environment). A more general assumption that may include this one is Assumption 5.
Assumption 5: Concepts representing concrete objects are less complex than those representing abstractions (because they are more accessible to direct experience).
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Of course, at least in the context of the present study (but probably in general), complexity is not an absolute notion; after all, we will investigate precisely those cases where metaphorical expressions are not the only way to express a given concept, but where a literal alternative is available. Thus, complexity is best understood as a gradual phenomenon: some concepts are more directly accessible to experience and easier to understand and thus less in need of conceptual support by metaphor, than others.
Finally, note that in the case studies below I will focus on the question whether the distinctive collexemes show differences in terms of style (in the sense in which the term is used in the present study) or complexity (in terms of the five assumptions just stated). This is not meant to suggest that there are no other semantic differences that could potentially be observed and discussed. On the contrary, there clearly are such differences, and in a few places I will point these out. However, a detailed analysis is not the aim of this paper, and will have to await a different study.
. Case studies
For each of the patterns, all instances were retrieved from the British National Corpus (Release 1) by concordancing the head noun (center, heart, beginning, etc.) followed by the respective preposition. False hits, i.e. hits not corresponding to the pattern under investigation, were manually removed. This search strategy ensured that all instances of each pattern were exhaustively identified. For each pair of patterns, the collexemes (the noun heading the NP slot, and in one case, the adjective modifying the head noun) were manually identified, lemmatized, and frequency lists were generated. These were then submitted to the distinctive collexeme analysis as described in the preceding section.
. The pattern in the center/heart of NP
The first pattern that I will investigate is the one in (3) the examples in (4a, b) are evidence that the alternatives can function as rough paraphrases of each other in at least some contexts: (3) in the {center/heart} of NP (4) a. [The station] was provided with platform canopies and flowers to enhance its attractive position beside the lake in the centre of the city. b. The princely town house stands beside a broad pond in the heart of the city.
The metaphorical use of heart in (4b) is motivated by the metaphorical mapping the center is the heart. This mapping is part of a more general U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y , all examples from CCED). Note that the specific manifestations of the objectas-organism mapping are all partial and unsystematic (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 52ff.) , i.e. there are generally just one or two body-part terms that can be applied to a specific object (for example, stairs have a head and a foot, but not a mouth, teeth, shoulders, etc.; mountains have a foot and a shoulder, but no head, leg, etc.), and it is not possible to predict which body-part terms may be applied to which object (e.g., why is the top of a mountain not called head, why is the blade of a saw not called gums, etc.). The object-as-organism mapping is thus not the type of systematic and very generally applicable metaphor that proponents of the cognitive hypothesis typically point to as support of their claims; according to Lakoff and Johnson, it is one of a set of idiosyncratic mappings that "do not interact with other metaphors, play no particularly interesting role in our conceptual system, and hence are not metaphors we live by" (1980: 55). 11 Thus, the pair of patterns in (4a, b) is a perfect candidate to begin my investigation without stacking the odds in favor of the cognitive hypothesis (I will discuss examples of more systematic and general metaphors further below). Table 2 lists the distinctive collexemes of in the center of NP and in the heart of NP.
The significantly distinctive collexemes of in the heart of NP consist exclusively of nouns referring to geographical locations, in the form of both common and proper nouns. This semantic class also dominates the marginally significant and non-significant collexemes, with a single exception (season). The distinctive collexemes (significant and non-significant) of in the center of NP also consist mainly of nouns referring to locations, but the nature of these locations is more heterogeneous than in the case of the metaphorical pattern, in that not all of them are geographical locations. Instead, there are a number of nouns that refer to parts of buildings (room, floor, wall, chamber, stage) . In addition, there are several nouns that do not refer to locations, but to furniture (table), household items (oven, plate, machine), a group of people (defence, used here in the sports sense), and a body part (forehead).
Let us relate these findings to the expectations formulated in Section 2.1 above. The main difference between the two patterns seems to be that the literal pattern occurs with all kinds of location nouns, while the metaphorical pattern is restricted to geographical location nouns. If we assume the cognitive U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y
The function of metaphor  
hypothesis, this can reasonably directly be related to our expectation concerning complexity. The non-geographical locations are much smaller than the geographical ones; assuming that larger entities are more complex than smaller ones (because they are more difficult to conceptualize in their entirety, cf. Assumption 1), the cognitive hypothesis accounts for the fact that the latter do not require metaphors to make them understandable to us, and hence do not occur in the metaphorical pattern. The same is true of the other words limited to the literal pattern. A room, a table, an oven, etc. can easily be conceptualized in their entirety and thus are easier to process than a city, a countryside, or a forest. This line of reasoning can be extended to a comparison of the geographical location nouns occurring in the two patterns: those occurring in the literal pattern all refer to rather small built-up areas (village, town, Darlington, Oxford) , while those occurring in the metaphorical pattern refer to larger built-up areas (city, London, West End), large natural areas (countryside, area, forest), and countries (e.g. England, France). A second, related aspect concerns the geometrical properties of the distinctive collexemes' referents (cf. Assumption 2). The entities referred to by the collexemes of the literal pattern all have comparatively simple, clearly recognizable shapes with easily determinable centers: most of them are either square (like rooms, tables, floors, squares, walls, ovens, fields, courtyards, etc.), or round (like circles, plates, and our idealized representations of towns, villages, islands, etc.). In contrast, the entities referred to by the collexemes of the metaphorical pattern mostly have complex shapes that are difficult to conceptualize or describe, even if we know them (like London, England, Surrey, etc.), or they do not have clearly delineable shapes at all (like city, countryside, country, area, etc.) . Here, in the heart of NP allows us to understand the notion center in a functional rather than a strictly geometrical way.
In sum, this case study has yielded results that are straightforwardly interpretable in terms of the cognitive hypothesis, even though the metaphorical mapping underlying in the heart of NP is not one of the general, systematic mappings that proponents of the cognitive hypothesis typically point to as evidence for their claims. The metaphorical pattern is associated with distinctive collexemes referring to concepts that are plausibly regarded as more complex than those referred to by the literal pattern's distinctive collexemes, and hence the notion of conceptual support is confirmed.
This does not mean that stylistic factors can be completely ignored in the choice between the two alternatives; clearly, the expression in the center of NP is stylistically neutral and likely to be found in all genres and registers, while U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y
The function of metaphor  in the heart of NP is associated with written genres. Thus, at a very general level, stylistic considerations clearly play a role. However, this role cannot be seen as support for the stylistic hypothesis, as stylistic considerations merely influence the availability of the choice between the literal and the metaphorical expression -they do not appear to influence the choice itself.
. The pattern at the center/heart of NP
The preceding section compared two patterns that typically have a concrete noun in the NP slot. In this section, I will investigate a superficially similar set of patterns that occur almost exclusively with abstract nouns. The patterns are shown in (5), the examples in (6a, b) show that the alternatives may occur in the same contexts and can thus be regarded as rough paraphrases:
(5) at the {center/heart} of NP (6) a. Curricular considerations are therefore at the centre of the decisionmaking process. b. All this may seem mere words, but words and their meaning are at the heart of the planning process.
Since the majority of nouns occurring in both patterns refer to abstract entities, both patterns are actually metaphorical in this case. Take examples (6a, b): a process has neither a heart (since it is not an organism), nor a center (since it is not even a physical entity). The metaphorical use of center is motivated by the very general image-schematic metaphor central is important; other examples of this mapping are The whole thing was . . . tangential to the real world of business (CCED), The new category was peripheral to their main business interests, and of course the adjective corresponding to center, as in Arms control will become even more central to military preoccupations. According to Lakoff (1987) , the existence of this mapping is based on our experience of living organisms and the relative importance of their more central and more peripheral components: "Injuries to central parts are more serious (i.e., not mendable and often life threatening) than injuries to the peripheral parts. Similarly, the center defines the identity of the individual in a way that the periphery does not." (Lakoff 1987: 274) . The metaphorical use of heart is a further extension of this image-schema, based on the personification metaphor discussed in the preceding section. Since both patterns are metaphorical, the question arises as to what differences we might expect between them in light of the cognitive and the stylistic hypotheses. The stylistic hypothesis might lead us to expect differences in emotionality, since the noun heart is presumably more emotionally charged than the noun center. In contrast, the cognitive hypothesis would once again suggest that the main differences will be found in the complexity of the distinctive collexemes' referents. Although both patterns are metaphorical, the centralas-important mapping is rather schematic, and based on an abstraction over many different types of experience; it thus adds less to our understanding of abstract entities than the additional, more specific heart-as-center mapping, which is much more directly experientially based. Thus, the expectations of the cognitive hypothesis are very similar to those formulated in the preceding section: at the center of NP should occur with nouns referring to concepts that are easier to understand than those referred to by the collexemes of at the heart of NP. Table 3 lists the distinctive collexemes for the two patterns.
Again, there is little evidence for the stylistic hypothesis. With the possible exception of first-ranked Europe (which in the examples in question refers to European politics, not to the actual geographical unit, as in The Prime Minister said ... that he wanted Britain to be at the heart of Europe), none of the distinctive collexemes of at the heart of NP can plausibly be interpreted as being more prone to occur in emotionally colored contexts than the collexemes of at the center of NP.
In contrast, an interpretation in terms of the cognitive hypothesis is once again possible and plausible: note that most of the significantly distinctive collexemes of at the centre of NP refer to human activities and human-scale events (row, scandal, attention, controversy, storm -used exclusively in the sense of 'controversy'/'outrage' in this pattern -, event, allegation, and case). In contrast, most of the distinctive collexemes of at the heart of NP come from the domain of abstract thoughts or ideas (Europe, defence -mostly used in the sense of 'defensive strategy in a sports game ' -, problem, matter, appeal, difficulty, policy, experience, and strategy) . It is plausible to assume that human-scale events and activities are more directly accessible to experience and easier to understand than abstract thoughts and ideas, and consequently less in need of conceptual support by metaphor (cf. Assumptions 4 and 5). As in the previous section, then, there is some support for the cognitive hypothesis.
Next, note the semantic class formed by stage, web, circle, sphere, and thing, which are all distinctive for the more schematic at the center of NP. Note that these nouns are themselves rather schematic terms, which, in the corpus, are all used metaphorically (for example, the political stage, a web of relationships, a widening circle of freedom) or in their mathematical sense (in the case of circle U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y
The function of metaphor  0.05 < p < 0.1 0.05 < p < 0.1 plan (5/1), bid (3/0), crossroads (3/0), decision-making (3/0), earth (3/0), field (3/0), maelstrom (3/0), mosaic (3/0), ring (3/0), speculation (3/0), trade (3/0), wake (3/0) process (3/11), education (1/7), book (0/4), economy (0/4), interpretation (0/4), operation (0/4), policy-making (0/4), success (0/4), development (1/6), philosophy (1/6), project (1/6) 0.1 < p < 0.25 0.1 < p < 0.25 power (4/1), argument (5/2), area (6/3), and sphere); their strong preference for the schematic pattern is probably best interpreted as evidence for a kind of 'metaphorical cohesion' , i.e. a reluctance to mix metaphors (or, in this case, levels of schematicity) unnecessarily (cf.
Martin, forthcoming, for solid corpus evidence of such cohesion phenomena; the existence of such phenomena may be the source of the prescriptive rule not to mix metaphors).
Finally, a methodological remark: note that the systematic differences observed for the distinctive collexemes also occur consistently among the marginally significant collexemes, and to some degree even among the nonsignificant distinctive collexemes; this is evidence for the suggestion made in Stefanowitsch and Gries (2003) and Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004) that when using Fisher-Yates exact p-values as association measures, the usual significance threshold of p<0.05 should not be seen as an absolute cut-off point, but that it is the ranking of collexemes provided by the method that is most important.
. The pattern at the beginning/dawn of NP
The preceding sections have dealt with spatial metaphors; in this section, I will look at an example of a literal-metaphorical difference from the domain of time. The patterns in question are shown in (7), evidence that they are rough paraphrases in some contexts is shown in (8): (7) at the {beginning/dawn} of NP (8) a. Communal life survived until the beginning of the nineteenth century and traditions peculiar to that way of life had lingered into the present. b. It is ironic that it has taken until the dawn of the 21st century to realise that the best methods of utilising . . . our woodlands are those employed a millennium ago.
The metaphorical use of dawn is motivated by the mapping a timespan is a day, which, as far as I know, has not been discussed in the literature. It is probably related in some way to the mapping lifetime is a day posited by Kövecses (2002: 44 In this example, twilight corresponds to old age and night corresponds to death. While these metaphors are quite widespread in Modern English poetry, 12 it is difficult to find examples from everyday language. The same is true of the more general a time period is a day; note that only the words eve
U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y
The function of metaphor  and dawn/dawning are used systematically (compare the eve of the civil war, the dawn of the 20th century with the non-occurring *the morning/noon/evening of the civil war, *the dusk of the 20th century). It seems, then, that we are dealing with a metaphorical mapping here that is also partial, but in a different sense than the mappings discussed in the preceding sections: it seems to be limited, for the most part, to poetic language. Thus, it provides an extreme test case for the two hypotheses -if stylistic factors have any substantial influence, we would expect to see it with a mapping that is restricted to literary forms of language. In other words, the odds are stacked even more strongly against the cognitive hypothesis here. Of course, this does not mean that the cognitive hypothesis has nothing to say about the mapping in question. As for a possible experiential basis of the more general mapping, it is clearly provided by our direct repetitive experience of days with their natural beginning and end. This natural, easily perceivable delimitation of a day should make it a useful concept in understanding less clearly delimited time periods. Thus, our expectation according to the cognitive hypothesis is that the metaphorical the dawn of NP should be associated with such non-delimited time periods, while the literal the beginning of NP should be associated with time periods that have a clearly defined beginning and end. Table 4 lists the distinctive collexemes of the two expressions.
As the semantics of the two patterns would lead us to expect, the lists of distinctive collexemes for both expressions are dominated by nouns referring to time spans. For the literal expression, the significant collexemes are both from this semantic class (year and century), as are most of the marginally significant expressions (end, period, term, week, month, May, and September) ; the only exceptions are an event (war), and chapter, which can be seen as a quasispatial use or as a metonymy whereby chapter also stands for an event (the reading of the chapter). In addition, although the individual names of months and the noun month itself are not significant collexemes of the literal pattern, the category 'names of months' (i.e. January, February, etc.) as a whole is significantly associated with this pattern (486/0, p = 7.79E-07); the same is true for the category 'names of years ' (i.e. 1840, 1970, etc.) (288/0, p = 2.95E-04).
For the metaphorical pattern, there are also many nouns referring to time spans (time, age, era, beginning, future) , and a number of nouns referring to events (dream, enlightenment, awakening, etc.) ; in addition, there are a number of time spans metonymically referred to by situations or entities (such as civilization, history, mankind, regime, or culture) . 13 Also note that the literal use of day has been included in the count; since it is the only word capable of oc-U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y  Anatol Stefanowitsch Note: Due to the vast difference in frequency of the two expressions, it is very difficult for the distinctive collexemes of the much more frequent literal pattern to reach the significance threshold of five percent even if they do not occur at all in the metaphorical one, while anything that occurs exclusively in the metaphorical pattern even once will automatically reach this threshold. Therefore, the latter have been listed separately.
curring with the literal meaning of dawn in this pattern, omitting it would not make much of a difference.
With respect to the cognitive and the stylistic hypotheses, an interpretation along the same lines as that proposed for in the {center/heart} of NP suggests itself (cf. Assumptions 1 and 2): The events and time spans referred to by the collexemes of the literal pattern (year and century as well as 'names of years' and 'names of months') are much shorter and much more clearly delineated than those referred to by the distinctive collexemes of the metaphorical expression (civilisation, time, history, age, etc.) , and this generalization holds even if we include the less significant and non-significant collexemes (which gives us week, month, and many names of individual months and years for the literal pattern, compared to nouns like democracy, creation, etc. for the metaphorical pattern).
Thus, the differences between the metaphorical and the literal expression for the beginning of something can once more be plausibly related to the cognitive hypothesis, even though the metaphorical mapping in question is plausibly regarded as more typical of literary registers. Again, this does not mean that we can simply negate the influence of register on metaphorical language: as before, there are clearly registers where the metaphorical at the dawn of NP would seem out of place and is thus not available as a choice (while at the beginning of NP is register-neutral and thus always available). However, it should again be stressed that this is by no means evidence for the stylistic hypothesis (cf. the arguments in Section 3.1 above).
. The pattern (ADJ) increase/rise/growth in NP
In this section, I will extend the methodology introduced in the preceding sections slightly in two directions. First, I will look not only at one position for potential collexemes, but at two: in addition to the prepositional object slot investigated in the preceding sections, I will also take into consideration the potential adjective slot in the pre-modifier position of the head noun. Second, and more importantly, I will explore not only differences between a literal and a metaphorical expression, but I will consider two alternative metaphorical expressions and also consider differences between these.
The pattern under investigation is shown in (9); the examples in (10a-c) show that the alternatives are indeed rough paraphrases at least in some cases (note that, unlike at the heart of NP and at the dawn of NP, the metaphorical expressions do not have any literary flavor): The pattern in (10b) (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 16) . The pattern in (10c) is based on the more specific mapping abstract development is natural physical growth, which according to Kövecses is based on the more general complex abstract systems are plants (cf. Kövecses 2002: 98ff.; note that Kövecses uses the label complex abstract systems as a cover term for a wide variety of target domains), but which may be better described more generally as (abstract) entities are organisms, since there are extremely few plant-specific expressions instantiating the mapping (Kövecses mentions the branch of a company), while there are many expressions related to the life cycle of organisms in general that are mapped onto abstract entities (e.g., This criticism is born out of ignorance, The content of the NBC programmes has ceased to be lifeless, a government programme to rescue the country's ailing economy, The tradition died out shortly afterwards, etc.). Kövecses sees the basis for the existence of this mapping in our "rich knowledge" about plants; more generally, we might say that the mapping is based in our knowledge about organisms (including ourselves) and their life cycles.
On the basis of these claims, we can formulate some general expectations about differences between the contexts in which each of these two mappings is more likely to be found if they serve a cognitive function.
First, note that the more-as-up mapping is more schematic than the system-as-organism mapping; thus, we might expect the latter to provide more conceptual support than the former. If this is true, nouns associated with growth in NP should in general refer to more complex concepts than nouns associated with rise in NP (recall that the distinction between a more schematic U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y
The function of metaphor  and a more specific metaphor is similar to the one between a literal expression and a metaphorical one, cf. Section 3.2 above).
Second, growth, as a natural process, is comparatively slow and unlikely to change direction suddenly, making it relatively predictable. In contrast, although the adding of a substance or objects to a container or pile may be a natural process (as with rain falling on a lake, snow accumulating on the ground, etc.), it does not have to be (as when humans manipulate objects or substances). As a consequence, the process of rising is less clearly associated with a particular speed than that of growing, and it is not inherently directional, making it less predictable (we can remove objects from a pile just as easily as adding them). Thus, we might expect the pattern growth in NP to be associated with slower and more predictable processes than the pattern rise in NP. Note that states and slow, predictable processes may be regarded as less complex than fast, unpredictable processes (based on the gestalt principles of good continuation and stability, cf. Wertheimer 1938).
Before we discuss the results in light of these expectations, however, let us briefly compare the two metaphorical expressions to the literal one at a general level. Table 5 lists the significant distinctive collexemes of the literal increase in NP and the metaphorical {growth/rise} in NP (the figures for the two metaphorical expressions were combined and overall distinctive collexemes were calculated; see below for a separate analysis of the two).
The differences between the literal pattern and the combined metaphorical patterns are much more subtle than in the case of the patterns investigated in the preceding sections, but on closer inspection, at least two noteworthy points of divergence can be observed. First, note that many of the collexemes on both lists come from the domain of economics (in the case of the literal pattern about a quarter, in the case of the metaphorical patterns, almost half of the significantly distinctive collexemes). If we focus on this semantic domain, we can observe that many of the literal pattern's collexemes refer to (aspects of) economic processes that are fairly directly influenced by human agents (thirdranked funding, and money supply, contribution, taxation, allowance, pay, child benefit, competition, and borrowing). In contrast, most of the collexemes associated with the metaphorical patterns refer to (aspects of) economic processes that are less easy to influence by human agents (the only exceptions being 24th-ranked export, and wage, sale, and income). It is not implausible to relate this to the cognitive hypothesis (cf. Assumption 4): human activities are presumably easier to understand than processes like those determining prices, interest rates, unemployment, the gross national product, etc., which, although ulti-U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y  Anatol Stefanowitsch frequency, number, density, height, size, capacity, volume, complexity, liquidity, percentage, load, space and length, which may be said to have a common semantic feature along the line of 'measurability' or 'quantifiability' , and are thus (quasi-)scientific terms. All of them are distinctive for the literal pattern; there are almost no such nouns among the collexemes for the metaphorical patterns, an exception being temperature, and possibly dioxide, creatinine, and index. The preference of such nouns for the literal pattern could be due to a reluctance concerning the use of metaphor in scientific contexts, and thus points to additional influencing factors beyond the cognitive and the stylistic hypothesis; these are outside the scope of this study.
In sum, while there is reason to assume that some of the differences between increase in NP and rise/growth in NP can be accounted for by the cognitive hypothesis, such an interpretation is less immediately obvious than in the case of the patterns discussed in the preceding sections. Part of the reason may be that we have collapsed the values for two different metaphorical patterns that may be quite different from each other. A detailed separate comparison of each of the metaphorical patterns with the literal pattern may shed further light on this issue, but let us instead turn to the main focus of this section, the direct comparison of the two metaphorical patterns with each other. Table 6a lists the distinctive noun collexemes for the two patterns.
A clear semantic difference emerges between the two metaphorical patterns. The top of the collexeme list for growth in NP is dominated by the 'complex abstract systems' from Kövecses' characterization of the mapping involved (e.g. economy, market, sector, business, etc.) , while the list for rise in NP is dominated by nouns defined relative to amounts of something (e.g. price, (interest) rate, cost, value, wage, charge, profit, etc.) . Again, this difference is easily interpretable in terms of the cognitive hypothesis. Generally, the very systematicity of the distinction is evidence for influencing factors beyond stylistic ones. More specifically, the difference bears out the first expectation outlined above: complex systems can be assumed to be more difficult to understand in their entirety than the internally non-differentiated amount nouns, and thus they receive stronger conceptual support.
The expectation concerning the speed and predictability with which the referents of the nouns typically develop is also confirmed by the distinctivecollexeme analysis. The referents of the distinctive collexemes of growth in NP are abstract entities that typically change comparatively slowly, and hence relatively predictably, with respect to size or quantity. The complex abstract systems just mentioned are a case in point, but the same is true of the amount nouns on the list (e.g. GDP, supply, membership, debt, GNP, etc.) . In contrast, the distinctive collexemes of rise in NP refer to abstract entities that change comparatively quickly, and hence much more unpredictably, with respect to size or quantity. Again, the collexemes mentioned above are representative in this respect (e.g. price, rate, cost, etc.) The factor of speed/predictability is also useful in interpreting the differences between the adjective collexemes of the two patterns. Table 6b lists the distinctive adjectives.
The factor of predictability manifests itself in adjectives like long-term, predicted, and projected for growth in NP vs. sudden and unexpected for increase in NP, and the factor of speed manifests itself in adjectives like slow, steady, annual, continuous, incremental, continued, and sustained for growth in NP vs. sharp, steep, and meteoric for rise in NP. Note that even the one adjective for fast change that does occur with growth in NP, namely rapid, is construed as developing through time, while sharp and steep are construed as instantaneous.
In sum, the results once again support the cognitive hypothesis. This does not come as a surprise at this point, since in this section we have actually looked at the sort of very general mappings, pervasive in everyday language, that the proponents of the cognitive hypothesis actually cite in support of their claims. Since we already saw the principle of conceptual support at work with less systematic and in some cases even register-specific mappings, it was of course entirely to be expected that the same should be true for fully systematic, register independent mappings. In addition, the analysis has provided some insight into the motivation for the existence of alternative metaphors for the same general target concept.
. The pattern understanding/grasp of NP
The patterns discussed in the preceding four subsections have all dealt with highly general target domains (space, time, and quantity). In this final subsection, I will extend the methodology to a slightly more specific target domain specifically related to humans: understanding. The pattern I will investigate is shown in (11); the examples in (12a, b) show that the alternatives can be rough paraphrases in some contexts:
(11) {understanding/grasp} of NP (12) a. ... the kind of causal factors that will provide us with an understanding of the social world. b. ... the group of disciplines that aim to provide us with a grasp of the social world.
The metaphorical use of grasp in (12b) is motivated by the metaphors ideas are objects (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 10f.) and understanding is seizing idea objects firmly (cf . Jäkel 1995: 202) , which is a special case of the more general mapping mental activity as physical manipulation (cf . Jäkel 1995: 198 1995: 202) . As far as the motivation for this mapping is concerned, Jäkel (1995: 220) first notes that the human hand is "the most prominent organ in our intentional interaction with the physical environment", a fact which makes it a likely source domain from the point of view of the cognitive hypothesis. He then claims that there is an experiential correlation . . . between mental activity and manipulation. At both levels, there is an intentional gathering of knowledge about the world: through tactile contact with objects as well as through learning and realization . . . abstract thinking is an internalized version of sensorimotor activity. (Jäkel 1995: 221) Note in this context that the metaphors postulated by Jäkel are sub-cases of a much more general mapping, the mind is the body (cf. Johnson 1987 , passim, Lakoff 1987 . From this perspective, the expectations of the cognitive hypothesis are, again, that the literal understanding of NP should be associated with concepts that are more easily understood than those associated with the metaphorical grasp of NP. Table 7 lists the distinctive collexemes of the two expressions. As before, there are several systematic differences between the lists of distinctive collexemes for the two expressions. To begin with, there is a difference with respect to the type of knowledge referred to by the distinctive collexemes: nouns referring to procedural knowledge ('knowing how') occur only with the metaphorical expression -language, English, French, idiom and grammar are unambiguous examples, but other collexemes of the metaphorical alternative also suggest this type of knowledge, in that they refer to knowledge systems which are applied in investigating and explaining phenomena (field, subject, principle, technique, speech, tactics, strategy, philosophy, psychology, style, and rule) . In contrast, the collexemes of understanding of NP typically refer to the phenomena themselves (process, nature, need, way, and the non-significant relationship, society, mechanism, etc.), i.e. to declarative knowledge ('knowing what'). Another semantic class of nouns that occurs exclusively with the 3.33E-02 philosophy (2/2) 3.33E-02 psychology (2/2) 3.33E-02 style (2/2) 3.33E-02 theology (2/2) 3.33E-02 form (7/3) 3.83E-02 rule difference (12/3), system (30/5), idea (14/3), analysis (1/1), audience (1/1), banking (1/1), brief (1/1), capitalism (1/1), challenge (1/1), chronology (1/1), conversation (1/1), craft (1/1), criteria (1/1), death (1/1), decimal (1/1), ergonomics (1/1), generation (1/1), grace (1/1), intricacy (1/1), medicine (1/1), practicality (1/1), proportion (1/1), regularity (1/1), report (1/1), teaching (1/1), those (1/1), vocabulary (1/1), content (7/2), topic (8/2), meaning (16/3), theory (16/3), knowledge (9/2), activity (2/1), causality (2/1), convention (2/1), democracy (2/1), geography (2/1), information (2/1), link (2/1), picture (2/1), scripture (2/1), terminology (2/1), structure (27/4) metaphorical pattern consists of nouns referring to component parts or individual aspects of a greater whole (detail, essentials, feature, form, complexity , and the marginally significant basics, matter, and material). In contrast, the concepts referred to by the literal pattern refer to the greater wholes themselves (notably, nature).
The latter difference can reasonably straightforwardly be interpreted in terms of the cognitive hypothesis: since the concepts referred to by the nouns just mentioned construe the world at a high level of resolution, they are presumably cognitively more complex, and hence in greater need of conceptual support, than the 'greater wholes' referred to by the distinctive collexemes of the literal expression (cf. Assumption 3). The difference relating to procedural and declarative knowledge is less straightforward. Although it does not sound implausible to say that procedural knowledge is more complex than declarative knowledge (it is difficult to make explicit, it takes longer to acquire, etc.), one could also make the opposite case (declarative knowledge is less intuitive, etc.). In other words, the issue of complexity is less clear here than in the case of the other expressions. However, the primary motivation for the difference in question is probably a different one anyway. Note that it makes sense that procedural knowledge, which is applied knowledge of how to do something, is understood in terms of manual manipulation; it is this kind of knowledge for which Jäkel's account of 'internalized sensorimotor activity' is most plausible. Declarative knowledge, in contrast, is knowledge about things, that is not usually acquired through physical activity. Thus, as in the case of the difference between growth and rise, the function of metaphor here is not simply to provide conceptual support, but to enable us to understand something in a particular way.
. Conclusions
The application of distinctive-collexeme analysis to near-synonymous pairs of literal and metaphorical expressions has yielded clear evidence for the cognitive hypothesis. First, for all of the pairs investigated, the distinctive collexemes showed systematic differences; this in itself is already evidence against the idea that metaphor is merely ornamental in nature. Second, the differences are clearly semantic in nature, and in the overwhelming number of cases, they can plausibly be related to the factor of complexity. In all these cases, the metaphorical pattern (or, where both patterns are metaphorical, the pattern based on the more specific metaphor) is associated with nouns referring to more complex concepts; this can reasonably be interpreted as evidence for the idea that metaphors provide conceptual support. In addition, two other factors were tentatively identified: metaphorical coherence, more precisely, a possible aversion towards mixing metaphors of different specificity; and the avoidance of metaphor in particular contexts. Neither of these factors was investigated in detail however, and future research must show the existence and extent of their influence. Finally, the comparison of two near-synonymous metaphorical patterns yielded evidence that points to the idea that metaphor not only helps us to understand abstractions, but that it can also help us to understand them in different ways.
Although the results of the case studies presented here all point towards the cognitive hypothesis, they must be considered preliminary in two respects. First, the case studies deal with only a handful of literal/non-literal pairs of expressions, all of which instantiate a single grammatical context. This restriction
